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Seeing is believing: symbolic politics and the opportunities of nondemocratic 
transition in Angola. 
 
Following the resignation of President José Eduardo dos Santos after 38 years in power, the August 
2017 elections in Angola were peaceful, yet of questionable results and returned the ruling party, 
MPLA, to power. However, in his first three months in office, the new President, João Lourenço has 
proceeded to some high-profile reshuffles and symbolic actions that have induced a palpable sense of 
optimism in the broader population, which seemed hardly warranted before the elections. This article 
reassesses the outcome of the elections from an Angolan perspective, based on fieldwork carried out in the 
capital, Luanda and the northern province of Uíge shortly after the polls. By examining how certain 
actions become symbols and what those symbols enable among Angolan citizens, the article offers a 
discussion of the weight of symbolic politics and the opportunities for change under conditions that fall 
short of formal standards of democratic process. 
 
In late August 2017 Angola went to the polls for the third time since the end of its nearly 
30-year-long civil war in 2002. This time, however, José Eduardo dos Santos, who had 
ruled the country for 38 years, did not stand again as his party’s candidate, having in early 
2017 announced his ‘retirement from active politics’ for 2018. In his stead, the MPLA 
party — the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola, which has dominated Angolan 
politics since independence in 1975 — fielded João Lourenço as its head of list and 
presidential candidate. Dos Santos and his family had since 2011 become the focal point 
of small, but highly visible youth protests, which demanded an end to his (mis-)rule, 
clamouring for change and a betterment of the socio-economic conditions of the 
population. Dos Santos stepping back came as a welcome surprise to most, but 
Lourenço, who had last served as Minister of Defence, seemed an unlikely candidate for 
change, given his trajectory within the party and the army, his liberation war credentials, 
and his demonstrated deference to dos Santos. He was widely seen as a rather lacklustre 
character, with some Angolan commentators calling him ‘dull’ and ‘not previously 
known for his intellectual capacities’, although he enjoyed, in direct comparison to some 
of his party comrades, a reputation of relative probity1. While he was soon nicknamed 
‘JLo’ by the population, his campaign, running under the motto ‘correct what is bad, 
improve what is good’ (corrigir o que está mal, melhorar o que está bem), failed to ignite much 
																																																								
1 Though the Angolan investigative journalist, Rafael Marques, has stated that Lourenço was one of 
Angola’s biggest landowners and a shareholder in two major commercial banks.   
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enthusiasm ahead of the elections. Moreover, dos Santos would remain head of the 
ruling party for the foreseeable future, which raised doubts about Lourenço’s capacity to 
take autonomous decisions.  
Election day itself was orderly and peaceful, despite reports of targeted voter 
disenfranchisement. The following day, however, the National Electoral Commission, 
nominally independent but dominated by the MPLA, announced a 61 per cent MPLA 
victory out of thin air: none of the provincial results had been tallied and parallel 
counting by the opposition indicated substantial opposition gains in key urban areas. 
Opposition injunctions to the Supreme Court were, unsurprisingly, dismissed, and 
despite some feeble protests, Lourenço was duly sworn in. This promised a continuation 
of the ruinous rule of the MPLA for the coming five years at least — or so it appeared. 
Yet three months after the elections one could start noting a palpable sense of optimism 
amongst Angolans, who, together with many Angola-watchers have been surprised by 
the pace of change.   
 
Neo-authoritarianism: more than big-man rule 
Like a number of African ‘post-liberation’ regimes, Angola bears the hallmarks of a 
typical, fairly stable ‘neo-authoritarian’ regime — the restrictions of press freedom, the 
rigging of electoral processes, the abuse of the privileges of incumbency, elaborate 
schemes of crony capitalism rewarding the politically connected, as well as the strict 
control of the spaces for independent and dissenting expression. Angola vies with 
Nigeria for the top spot of Africa’s oil-producing countries, yet as a Portuguese-speaking 
country that is still difficult to access, it remains largely unknown to the wider public 
outside the Lusophone world. Held as a paradigmatic case of ‘illiberal peacebuilding’ 
(Soares de Oliveira 2011), the country posted record growth rates from 2002 till 2014, 
when a crash in world oil prices sent the country’s oil-dependent economy into a tailspin. 
This further aggravated the hardships for a large majority of the urban and rural 
population, who remained excluded from the previous economic growth and the much-
touted ‘benefits of peace’ (Schubert 2015). A number of small but highly visible protests 
since 2011 were violently repressed; however, after the oil price crash the government 
intensified its repression. Rather than admitting the severity of the economic crisis, which 
had been aggravated by profligate spending, mismanagement and elite embezzlement of 
public funds, the government unleashed the most violent persecution of ‘internal 
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enemies’ since the end of the war. Back then the dominant sentiment was dos Santos was 
willing to cling to power by any means possible.  
 Much of the commentary on Angola (and often, too, in similar socio-political 
contexts) tends to explain the ‘authoritarian dispensation’ in place through a combination 
of patronage, coercion, and an apathetic citizenry, too traumatized by the combined 
effects of the civil war and a turn to predatory capitalism to develop an independent 
political consciousness. There is a dominant Western discourse on autocratic rulers 
which is based on the idea that one man wields power (Krohn-Hansen 2008), resulting in 
an obsession with personal rule (and the admittedly oftentimes fascinating excesses of 
power), which ultimately risks reproducing the idea of unchanging Africa, mired in 
corruption and big-man politics. The long-standing autocrats of this world are (or were, 
in the case of Angola’s dos Santos and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe) clearly shrewd 
political operators, but, ‘even in the most repressive regimes, political power is far more 
dispersed and transactional than is most often assumed’ (Krohn-Hansen 2008, 8). 
Therefore, ‘the analysis of authoritarian rule ought to be solidly rooted in examinations 
of everyday life’ and should ‘view authoritarian states as sets of cultural processes’ 
(Krohn-Hansen 2008: 5; see also Jourde 2009: 203-04). And yet, despite these justified 
anthropological criticisms of analyses of ‘big-man rule’, my recent fieldwork in Angola 
suggests that the change of the figure at the top has already had significant symbolic 
impact on the political subjectivities of Angolans, which in turn opens up new spaces for 
debate (and potentially action). So how to make sense of the apparent importance of 
replacing one person while leaving the structures of power seemingly untouched from an 
anthropological perspective? Ethnography can reveal and render intelligible political 
formations ‘below the threshold of visibility for normative conceptions of political 
action’ (von Schnitzler 2016: 9), and give us a different perspective on the cultural 
processes that reproduce dominance in the everyday. Returning to the ‘logic of practice’ 
of highly personalised power (Wedeen 1999: 25), might help us understand how a visible 
shift in the ‘aesthetics of power’ (Mbembe 2001) could very quickly have noticeable 
effects on political culture in everyday practice.  
 
Seeing is believing: the weight of symbols 
How can we then account for the importance given by Angolans to Lourenço’s election? 
I suggest this has to do with the weight of symbols in a political system shaped by strong 
personalisation and deference to hierarchy. Let us briefly cut back to 2011: In the 
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everyday chaos of Luanda’s traffic jams, the presence of powerful SUVs was a signifier 
of real-life power relations, with the presidential motorcade as the most powerful of 
these signifiers. Whenever President dos Santos moved through the city, traffic lanes 
were blocked, sometimes hours in advance, by heavily armed soldiers and Presidential 
Guard Unit troops positioned every hundred metres. And what a spectacle it was when 
he finally rushed through: preceded by police motorcycle outriders, 5 gleaming black G-
Class Mercedes with tinted windows sped past the immobilised onlookers, followed by 
an ambulance, two pick-ups carrying the heavily armed Presidential Guard, a black 
Toyota Prado, one light troop carrier, and further police motorcycles. When traffic was 
light, the motorcade rushed by, like a fleeting apparition, but most of the times the rest 
of the road users got stuck in the roadblocks for several hours during which nothing 
moved. ‘When Zé Dollar [dos Santos] passes, the country stands still — he’s really Zé 
Dollar’, commented a driver of a collective taxi. This truly epitomized presidential 
grandiosity, the spectacle of symbolic violence and obscenity that are an integral part of a 
‘generalised aesthetics and stylistics of power’ in Sub-Saharan Africa that bind the ruler 
and the ruled in mutual ‘zombification’ (Mbembe 2001: 104, 115).  
 Fast forward to 2017, 3 months after Lourenço’s election: the actual focus of my 
research was on experiences of the Northern Front during Angola’s civil war, but both in 
formal interview settings and spontaneous chats the new president came up time and 
again, and in my conversations and observations the sense of optimism was palpable. 
The contrast was especially striking when compared to my previous research in and on 
Angola since 2007, in which the last years of dos Santos’ rule left many people jaded and 
deeply pessimistic for the country’s future. I spoke to street-side traders and money-
changers, to church elders, state functionaries, entrepreneurs and academics, as well as to 
politicians and former commanders of the major opposition party (and former rebel 
movement) UNITA. The latter were somewhat guarded, though willing to give Lourenço 
the benefit of doubt. To my surprise, however, most others, regardless of their usually 
often critical stance toward the rule of the MPLA in recent years, were positively 
swooning over ‘o kota JLo’ (an endearing Kimbundu/Luanda slang term for ‘elder’). They 
remarked especially on his ‘humility’ and simplicity, and contrasting this with the 
experience of dos Santos. Indeed, Lourenço only travels with one motorcycle outrider, 
the armed sentinels and street closures have disappeared, and ‘he even ordered his 
convoy to stop at the red light!’ He also, I was told in a mixture of wonder and glee, 
queued at the KFC like an ordinary citizen, and made a private visit to a friend who was 
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in hospital, driving his own car and entering the premises of the hospital unguarded, in 
the only company of his wife.  
In the week leading up to Independence Day (11 Nov) Lourenço visited the 
restive province of Cabinda — ‘and he slept in the province, can you imagine? The Old 
Man [dos Santos] never did that in 38 years — if he went to the provinces, he would stay 
for 3 to 4 hours maximum, and then quickly escape back to his palace!’ The official 
celebrations of Dipanda (the Angolan term for independence) were then staged in the 
municipality of Matala, in the southern province of Huíla. When Lourenço’s plane 
touched down in the provincial capital, Lubango, a welcome committee of MPLA, OMA 
(Organização da Mulher Angolana, the MPLA’s women’s wing) and OPA (Organização 
Pioneiros Agostinho Neto, the youth/pioneer movement of the party) were waiting for 
him, waving party flags. Lourenço, however, refused to leave the plane until they all had 
left, saying he was here as president for the entire country, not of the party.  
At first, this all seemed like purely symbolic politics. But the importance of such 
symbols should not be underestimated. ‘O Angolano quer ver para crer’ (Angolans want to 
see to believe), I was repeatedly told. As one friend, a lawyer in his late thirties told me, 
‘We need to see some improvements to our lives, otherwise why bother with elections? 
And I think João Lourenço has made a clear analysis of the situation, and he knows that 
he has to listen to the people in the current situation, or else the people will go out and 
protest. That’s why he’s acting closer to the people, more humbly — if he has the 
backing of the population, then the MPLA will not be able to oppose his plans. 
Conversely, if he listens to the MPLA and not the people, it will be very bad. The people 
will turn against the MPLA saying “let the man work!” ’  
 
Reassessing the elections 
Accordingly, while the 2017 election results appeared more or less fabricated out of thin 
air (Pearce et al. 2018, 7–8), a disillusioned outside perspective that only picks up on the 
shortcomings of the elections has to undergo a corrective, when viewed from Angola. 
Despite a less-than-perfect electoral process, replacing dos Santos evidently counted for 
a lot. Angolans are overall lucid about the flaws of the elections, and harbour little 
illusions that the democratic system would now all of a sudden be fixed, but nonetheless 
the change the elections marked is real and is having an impact on individuals and the 
possibilities of collective action. My interlocutors made the following points to clarify 
their view on this: JLo is now much more popular than before the elections (cue the 
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KFC and red light episodes), and that the chant of Lourenço amigo, o povo está contigo 
(Lourenço, friend, the people stand with you), an old MPLA slogan that had sounded 
increasingly hollow under dos Santos, is no longer completely off the mark. Dos Santos, 
by contrast is now massively unpopular, even ‘within the party there are guys who can no 
longer stand him, who can no longer look him in the eye’, as several long-standing 
MPLA members (some of whom more critical than others) told me.  
As two of my Angolan colleagues vividly discussed over a lunch in a popular 
buffet place, Lourenço apparently wanted to go into the elections ‘a peito aberto’ (openly), 
to gauge how popular he and the party really were. ‘And the camaradas said, “OK, we’ll let 
you see what happens”, but they still put in place the whole machinery [of fraud]. On the 
evening of the elections, JLo went to the party HQs to await results there. But when the 
results started coming in, they realised they had lost control, and that with the fraud of 
previous years alone [voter disenfranchisement, ballot-stuffing and voter-buying in the 
provinces, see Roque (2013); Schubert (2010)] they would still lose. That’s when they 
decided to announce victory regardless of the numbers — and that’s why JLo left, angry, 
after half an hour only [meaning, according to my colleagues, that he did want to win 
without having to resort to fraud]. Then Camarada Jú Martins [a shadowy party 
strategist] announced the resounding victory of the Eme with 65% — though he could 
not state it very convincingly’.  Especially the last point about Martins speaks to 
Angolans’ long experience of decoding and interpreting the public visibility and 
disappearance of party members.   
Similarly, an outside perspective that chastises opposition parties as weak or even 
spineless for not mounting a more robust challenge to the results does not entirely hold 
up to scrutiny when viewed from Angola. As the discussion over lunch continued, 
UNITA, Angola’s main opposition party and former ‘rebel group’ during the civil war, 
may know the ‘real’ numbers of the election results, but they are not making them public 
(this is a statement I heard repeatedly). However, the party’s leader, Isaías Samakuva 
showed great restraint in accepting the results — in fact, according to many, Samakuva is 
the man of the hour who ‘saved’ peace in Angola by accepting the results. According to 
my colleagues, ‘Samakuva said at a UNITA rally in 2015 that he had received a 
[symbolic] whistle (o apito da alvorada) from Savimbi, [UNITA’s larger-than-life founder, 
killed in combat in 2002], and that “if they continue to chatear (harass) us, I will blow that 
whistle!” All the young hotheads cried out “blow it now, blow it now!” after which 
Samakuva had to brake and calm down everything. Now again, some youths were eager 
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to prove their willingness to die and contest the results in the street, but Samakuva 
restrained them and everyone in the party. If they had had a maluco (crazy man) like 
Numa [a former high-level UNITA military commander and ex-deputy] as head of the 
party, nem pensar (perish the thought) what could have happened. Because the army 
would not allow that — it would have been a bloodbath, many people killed’. The last 
idea, that Samakuva prevented an escalation of violence by recommending that youth 
activists not take the streets (cf. Pearce et al. 2018, 11), was echoed by several 
interlocutors, who still actively remember the time of the war. The rumours surrounding 
the election, often circulated in closed WhatsApp groups among party members, indicate 
that the conspiratorial mode of understanding politics still lives on among Angolan 
citizens. The —real or imagined— fear of a bloodbath especially speaks to the affective 
charge of embodied experiences (cf. Laszczkowski and Reeves 2015) of living with a 
state power that has historically often been experienced as arbitrary, and with the power 
to violently disrupt people’s lives. More than only the war, in fact, the memory of the 
repression unleashed by the MPLA against its own following the 27 May 1977 still casts a 
long shadow, and is often cited both by regime supporters and detractors as the main 
reason why it is dangerous to openly contest the party in power (Pawson 2014, Schubert 
2017).   
 
The opportunities of nondemocratic transition 
Why then the optimism about Lourenço, despite overall agreement that the elections 
were far from free and fair? During the last decade of the rule of ex-president dos 
Santos, the personalisation and strong hierarchisation of social relations, as well as the 
imagery that goes with it, fostered, according to many, a ‘culture of sim chefe’ (yes boss) in 
the administration, where no one was willing to take any independent decision for fear of 
the chefe’s possible reprisals, such as losing their position in one of the frequent 
administrative reshuffles. However, this pervasive imagery of hierarchy goes beyond the 
public administration. This is how power works in Angola, because people perceive it as 
such across the social strata.  
During the dos Santos years, whichever decision was taken, whichever action 
carried out, it was done with reference to ominous orientações superiores (higher directives) 
that may well have come from the President himself. In Mozambique, Euclides 
Gonçalves has shown that similar orientações superiores circulate as provisional instructions 
providing “parameters for action without being precise” but in the form of actual drafts 
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or public pronouncements by senior state and party officials (Gonçalves 2013, 610–1). In 
Angola, by contrast, it very often remained unclear whether instructions were really 
issued, or whether individuals were only acting out what they imagined to be the will of 
the chefe in pre-emptive obedience (what is in German called vorauseilender Gehorsam, or 
obedience hurrying ahead). Merely invoking these higher directives then justified all 
courses of action, ranging from police brutality to administrative and judicial 
arbitrariness. The vagueness of the formulation certainly served its purpose of obscuring 
the lines of command and reinforcing the nebulousness of power — as well as, 
ultimately, absolving the figure of the President from any personal responsibility for the 
misdeeds of his underlings.   
 However, much as the culture of pre-emptive obedience served to close down 
spaces under dos Santos, the practice of following orientações superiores now appears to be 
opening spaces. It was instructive to see how Lourenço’s speeches were meticulously 
dissected by my friends and interviewees, and how every word was weighted for its 
possible political relevance. While in the electoral campaigns the ‘bad’ things that needed 
correcting were never clearly identified, Lourenço called out various evils such as 
corruption in his inaugural speech. He did not name any names, but Angolans who have 
learnt through years of practice to read between the lines and expressing grievances 
through rumours and gossip (J. Gonçalves 2017, 241, e.g.) said it was evident who he 
meant, and said their days were counted — the nebulous, yet often specifically identified 
eles (they), the leading figures from dos Santos’ entourage and his family. 
 Lourenço also denounced the lack of unbiased reporting in the state media, 
which he said should serve the people, not the party. Jornal de Angola, the only daily 
newspaper, as well as the public TV broadcasters, all had in the past years mainly been 
known for their increasingly absurdist denial of reality and insistence that everything was 
fine in the country, leaving Angolans only dark humour as possible response (Kligman 
1998). However, almost overnight some news items appeared that, if not outright critical 
reporting, at least admitted that some things were not quite as perfect as they had until 
now been made out to be. Several weeks later, Lourenço appointed a new board of 
directors for the Jornal, thereby formalising the new direction he’d already outlined in his 
speech.2  
																																																								
2 Since then, opposition members have been given space to write opinion columns; journalists are now 
also admitted to cover debates at the National Assembly.   
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This willingness to seize the opportunities hinted at in official statements, and 
interpret them in practice as an exhortation to reform was echoed by a friend working 
for an oil multinational: ‘even if he’s not a real reformer, there are so many people like us 
everywhere, willing to seize whichever small space they are granted by new laws, 
regulations, or simply a new spirit that the door cannot be closed again’. What this 
shows, I think, is how Lourenço’s — so far largely symbolic — decisions had immediate 
impact on the decisions made by everyday people.  
This speaks to the weight of political signals given at the top beyond the case of 
Angola. Societies change before formal changes are enacted. To give an example from a 
different context, the hardening stance of the UK Home Office and its increasing 
propensity to forcibly deporting individuals and even separating families settled in the 
UK could be noted before any new laws or decrees were signed. Rather, this change in 
practice likely happened because the Tory party leadership clearly signalled it was in the 
national interest to do so.3 Very similar arguments have been made about how President 
Trump’s statements have shifted the boundaries of what was publicly acceptable in the 
US since his election, with some branches of the government seizing that space more 
enthusiastically than others. The normalisation of racist statements in the public in both 
cases (Shore 2016, Stoler 2017, e.g.) are a further indication of the importance of signals 
given ‘at the top’ of a hierarchically organized political system. For every such example, 
there are obviously also counter-examples, such as Fuglerud’s work on asylum claims in 
Sweden, which shows how public functionaries embody a sense of duty that they hold 
independent of shifts in political leadership, going as far as ‘correcting’ the excessive 
hardening or liberalisation of the immigration regime by successive ministers in their 
daily work (2004). Recent news of German commercial airline pilots refusing to take off 
when forcibly repatriated asylum seekers are on board are another case in point,4 as are 
the functionaries in the US Environmental Protection Agency who have vowed to resist 
President Trump’s repeal of certain regulations.5  
In the case of Angola, there had certainly also been instances of more 
autonomous decision-making in the public administration under dos Santos, yet these 
were often individual decisions, and fraught with risk, as they went against the imputed 
																																																								
3 Though arguably Theresa May’s previous leadership of the Home Office certainly made sure that this 
new spirit was duly implemented early on.   
4 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-pilots-refuse-deport-asylum-seekers-
lufthansa-angela-merkel-migrants-a8092276.html (accessed 6 Dec 2017). 
5 http://uk.businessinsider.com/how-to-resist-trumps-agenda-by-ex-epa-staffers-2017-7?r=US&IR=T 
(accessed 6 Feb 2018).  
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will of the ‘higher orders’, and were often curtailed by detailed presidential decrees. Now, 
the sense of relief appeared palpable. In a context where authority is excessively 
hierarchical and the public administration so evidently partisan (Schubert 2010: 659), 
acting more independently apparently required a strong signal from the top that it was 
now OK to do so.  
I would not go as far as to postulate a direct link between instances of pre-
emptive obedience and the authoritarian tendencies inherent to the respective polity, but 
the willingness expressed by many of my informants to push for change and widen the 
spaces made available to them confounds the hitherto predominant idea of a leaden 
‘culture of fear’ cowing the population into submission. True, until before the last 
elections, the overall impression was still that embodied knowledge about the ubiquity of 
surveillance by the state security services produced ‘political subjects and subject 
dispositions useful to the regime’ (Verdery 1996: 24). Now, however, the rapid, visible 
waning of dos Santos’ influence in the realm of formal and party politics has opened up 
possibilities for people, from party loyalists to ordinary citizens, to openly and publicly 
criticize dos Santos for his failings over the past ten years:  ‘Esse camarada assegurou a paz, 
muito bem. Mas a factura ficou muito pesada…’ (This Comrade secured peace, alright. But the 
bill was very hefty), is how my barber, for example, concluded his 30-minute long tirade. 
So much of what happens in Angola is not just about official directives from the top, but 
based on informal signals (‘higher directives’). Angolans, who have learnt during years of 
authoritarian rule to decode and interpret these signals, now appear to feel that all the 
signals align to indicate the possibility of opening and reform. And thus, Lourenço’s 
campaign motto has been picked up and reappropriated to formulate citizens’ hopes for 
change, appearing in unexpected places such as a wooden board at a carwash by a river 
crossing outside of the provincial capital of Uíge: ‘correct what is bad, improve what is 
good’.  
 This suggests that there is potential for political change, even in a system 
experienced as totalising as the one in Angola. I would argue that change in such a 
context of neo-authoritarianism will be most effective when formulated from within the 
parameters of the system (Schubert 2017): in deference to hierarchy, and through 
repertoires that are culturally resonant (i.e. inspiring a population hungry for change) but 
that are also legible to power, allowing for the responsiveness of o poder (power), without 
it having to appear to ‘giving in’ to more confrontational challenges to the regime, such 
as those mounted by the ‘youth protesters’ in the past five years.  
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Conclusion 
It remains to be seen whether the highly symbolic actions of Lourenço will translate into 
the ‘real change’ Angolans are hoping for. In the first three months, he has made 250 
new appointments, as well as a number of very high-profile dismissals, designed to gain 
control over the administration and parastatals by purging them of dos Santos loyalists. 
This included, most notably, removing Isabel dos Santos, daughter of José Eduardo dos 
Santos and Africa’s wealthiest woman, from her position as head of state oil company 
Sonangol, cancelling a contract between a production company of two other of president 
dos Santos’ children and two of the three TV broadcasting companies, and finally also 
dismissing José Filomeno ‘Zénú’ dos Santos as chairman of the Angolan Sovereign 
Wealth Fund in January 2018. Overturning especially Isabel’s appointment, which had 
been deeply unpopular even within the party, further bolsters Lourenço’s popularity. 
Many are rightly asking whether this is not just a game of musical chairs (dança das 
cadeiras) in which a new network of beneficiaries connected to Lourenço will take the 
place of the previous one. This might be too early to tell: his wife, the economist Ana 
Dias Lourenço, had previously been the Executive Director for Africa at the World 
Bank, and has a good reputation in Angola, and their six children have until now kept a 
low profile, though the independent Angolan news site Club-K suggested that 
Lourenço’s early nominations were based on shared family or business links.6 Moreover, 
while the dos Santos family were certainly the most visible beneficiaries of the system, 
they were by far the only ones. It is far from certain that Lourenço will attack the 
economic oligopolies of the army’s ‘business generals’ with the same zeal as he appears 
to tackle the interests of the dos Santos (cf. Pearce et al. 2018, 14-15). The judiciary for 
now also remains deeply partisan, and the long-promised ‘diversification of the economy’ 
will also take more than just the removal of Isabel dos Santos to happen. As some more 
skeptical Angolan commentators have noted, he has not done anything laudable yet. As 
opposition deputy Mihela Webba said, ‘the people cannot live on dismissals and 
appointments alone. When the people see the economic reality that we cannot live off 
our salaries, with the existing sanitation, with the lack of drugs and hospitals that are not 
working, the disillusionment will start’.7 And there seems, for now, little hope that 
																																																								
6 Club-K, ‘Novas nomeações baseadas no compadrio’ http://mail.club-
k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29617:nomeacoes-baseadas-no-
compadrio&catid=8:bastidores&lang=pt&Itemid=1071, accessed 8 Feb 2018.   
7 ‘O povo não vive só com exonerações e nomeações … Quando vier a realidade económica de que 
não se pode viver com os salários que existem, com o saneamento que existe, com a falta de 
medicamentos, com hospitais que não funcionam, a desilusão vai começar’ VOA Português, 
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parliamentary politics will prove a more effective counterweight to the constitutional 
dominance of the executive in this time of crisis, with opposition deputies until now 
primarily reaffirming their rights to privileges of office such as expensive, state-bought 
luxury limousines.  
Still, the symbolism of the changes at the top is evident, and Lourenço seems 
willing to use the near-absolute powers the 2010 constitution gives the president to 
emancipate himself from the shadow of dos Santos. While central elements of Angolan 
political culture — the deference to hierarchy, the importance of family links, the weight 
of history, and the MPLA’s stated belief in its right to direct the country’s destiny 
(Schubert 2017) — are likely to be more durable than just the next electoral cycle, ‘JLo’ 
for many now incarnates the possibility of change. The marked contrast of his first 
public actions to dos Santos’ style of rule has opened up symbolic opportunities that 
Angolans appear to be willing to seize. After 38 years of ditadura dos kotas (dictatorship of 
the elders) this has raised justified hopes that o poder might just become a little more 
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